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Today’s Presentation
• Illustrates some key strategic aspects for conducting effective 
concept design & design-to-cost trade studies
 What concept design is & why it’s important
 Fidelity needed in concept design solution
 Techniques in designing mission level trade space 
 Challenges in determining credible design convergence  
 Recommended practices 
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Important Note
• Concept design may be conducted using a variety of methods
• This presentation describes selected aspects of one method for 
conducting a concept design study 
 Uses space observatory example
 Best suited to immature mission concepts that advance state of the art 
and that have high design uncertainty
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What Concept Design is 
& 
Why it’s Important
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Concept Design is Exploratory Process to 
Determine System Level Design Baseline 
• Conducted in pre-Phase A & Phase A of Project Life Cycle to 
provide “feasible” system level design baseline for new concept 
• As much an investigation of requirements as of design
 Concurrent investigation of:
 Concept of operations
 Requirements
 Design 
 Performance
 Technology development
 Verification approach
 Flight dynamics
Ground segment  (ground stations, mission & science ops centers)
 Launch interface
 Cost 
 Schedule
 Risks, etc. 
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Concept Design Performed in Pre-Phase A 
& Phase A of NASA Project Life Cycle
*Adapted from NASA Project Life Cycle 
NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 7120.5E 
Pre-Phase A
Concept 
Studies
Phase A
Concept & 
Technology 
Development
Phase B
Preliminary 
Design & 
Technology 
Completion
Phase C
Final Design 
& 
Fabrication
Phase D
System Assembly, 
Integration & 
Test, Launch & 
Checkout
Phase E
Operations & 
Sustainment
Phase F
Closeout
SRR MDR PDR CDR
MCR Mission Concept Review
SRR System Requirements Review
MDR Mission Definition Review
PDR Preliminary Design Review
CDR Critical Design Review
MCR
Figure 1
July
7
Concept Design Plays Central Role in 
Project Success 
• Earliest life cycle phases have most leverage over life cycle cost 
(LCC)
 Concept design product effectively locks (or renders unchangeable) the 
majority of system LCC
• Such extraordinary leverage presents business case for 
conducting concept design in pragmatic & rigorous fashion 
 Particularly important for immature mission concepts that advance state 
of the art and that have high design uncertainty
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Majority of Life Cycle Costs are Locked by 
Concept Design
Conceptual illustration from ref. (c), adapted for presentation
Figure 2
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Concept Design Plays Central Role in 
Project Success (Cont’d)
• Done well, provides executable system level design baseline for 
project teams in Phase B & later phases 
• Not done well, can subject project teams in Phase B & later 
phases to system level redesign – in some cases, to multiple 
system level redesigns accompanied by: 
 Fluid technical baselines with ever-decreasing capabilities
 Cost overruns & recurring schedule delays
 Contract disputes & cancellations
 Challenges in retaining trained personnel
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Pre-Phase A / Phase A Offer Unique Venue 
for System Level Trades
• Teams small, agile, closely coordinated
 Typically operate absent many formalities of later project phases
 e.g., typically no prime contracts, system level requirements not under 
configuration control until late in phase A
 Can accommodate high rate of change in system level “requirements” & 
design characteristics (R&DC) 
 Enables broad investigation of trade space in relatively short time
• Note:
 “requirements” in quotes denotes interim reference capabilities used to 
guide evaluation of point designs in trade space
 System level requirements aren’t baselined until SRR for a final concept 
design that meets technical & programmatic (including cost & schedule) 
constraints 
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Phase B & Later Development Phases Not 
Well Suited for System Level Trades
• In Phase B, system level design is more difficult & expensive to 
change, e.g., 
 Teams typically larger & more distributed 
 Prime contracts typically in place
 System level requirements typically under configuration control 
 Preliminary design work assumes system level design complete
• In Phases C & D, system level changes even more difficult & 
expensive to change 
 Teams typically even larger than in Phase B
 System & subsystem level requirements typically under configuration 
control 
 Detailed design work either underway or has been completed
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Fidelity Needed in Concept Design 
Solution
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A Proposed Definition for “Feasible”
• The term “feasible” is used frequently in concept design, but its 
use is often problematic
 Often left undefined & subject to interpretation
• This presentation uses “feasible” mission concept to mean:
 Technical, cost, & schedule characteristics for a single, baseline mission 
concept design have been credibly converged to the 1st order by the end 
of Phase A, 
 such that the design may be developed, launched, operated, & 
decommissioned by a competent project team starting in Phase B within 
customary technical & programmatic margins
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A Proposed Metric for Level of 
Convergence (1 of 2)
• Credible convergence to 1st order by end of Phase A means:
 System level sizing & performance (SLSP) of mission elements is 
confidently determined to within 90% of SLSP when flight system is 
delivered
 For given cost & schedule constraints
 i.e., there is residual uncertainty that SLSP could change by           
± ~10% between end of Phase A & launch
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A Proposed Model for Product Fidelity 
During Design Phases (Solid Black Curve)*
*Adapted from ref. 
(a), Fig. 3-4
Figure 3
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A Proposed Metric for Level of 
Convergence (2 of 2)
• Solid black curve in Fig. 3 (uniform convergence) shows 
allowable SLSP error decreases as design moves from 
Phases A through C
 End Phase A:  1st order, or 90%     (accurate to 1 digit,   ~ ± 10% error)*
 End Phase B:  2nd order, or 99%    (accurate to 2 digits, ~ ± 1% error)
 End Phase C:  3rd order, or 99.9% (accurate to 3 digits, ~ ± 0.1% error)
• Metrics for SLSP error are approximate guidelines only
 Coarse model that depicts an idealized trend of fidelity in each 
phase
 Assume calculations done properly, but with incomplete or incorrect 
information / assumptions
• * read  as 9 x 101 %, accurate to 1 significant digit
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Example SLSP Error Convergence for 
Mass
• For a 4,000 kg space observatory, system level mass should be 
known to:
 End Phase A:  Within ~ ± 10%, or ~ ± 400 kg of final launch mass
 End Phase B:  Within ~ ± 1%, or ~ ± 40 kg of final launch mass
 End Phase C:  Within ~ ± 0.1%, or ~± 4 kg of final launch mass
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Role of (Selected) Resource Margins on 
Required Convergence
• Solid black curve in Fig. 3 must be within envelope of required 
margins
 Power & Dry Mass Margin requirements (per ref. (f)) are shown in Fig. 3
 End Phase A:  ≥ 25%
 End Phase B:  ≥ 20%
 End Phase C:  ≥ 15%
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Importance of Concept Design 
Convergence to Project Manager
• Project Manager at start of Phase B holds 25% margins for 
power & dry mass resources (Fig. 3)
 Can accommodate concept design credibly converged to within 10% of 
flight sizing & performance values for power & dry mass
 Even if 10% error occurs in direction of needing more resources
 Can’t accommodate concept design credibly converged to within 30% of 
flight sizing & performance values for power & dry mass
 if 30% error occurs in direction of needing more resources
 Design de-scope likely required
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Techniques for Designing Mission Level 
Trade Space
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Concept Design Mission Level Trade Space
Selecting Trades to Expedite Convergence – 3 Cycle Example
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Figure 4
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• Approach in Fig. 4 deduces R&DC for C design by interpolating 
on results from A & B designs (bounding cases) 
 Technical capability of point C isn’t known at outset of study
• More like root finding algorithm than like successive refinement 
design process typically used in Phases B & C  
 In Phases B & C, each design is refinement of “baseline” system level 
design from prior phase
 In concept design process discussed here, typically there isn’t a 
“baseline” system level design until concept design is complete
• Purposely views design problem from multiple perspectives
 Illuminates aspects that otherwise may have remained hidden
 Helps stimulate creative thinking & mitigate biases
 Accelerates discovery of “unknown unknowns” 
Concept Design Mission Level Trade Space
Selecting Trades to Expedite Convergence – 3 Cycle Example
(Cont’d)
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Why Selecting Bounding Cases is 
Important
• Failure to select bounding cases may cause extrapolation to 
determine R&DC for final solution
 Adds risk in technical, cost, & schedule estimates
 May result if both A & B designs exceed cost & schedule constraints
 Implies R&DC for B design didn’t identify “true” science or technology floor 
(presumes a solution exists)
• Or, may cause need for more design cycles 
 Deadline may not permit, or may drive significant team overtime 
• Optimistic A designs & “false” science floors for B designs are 
common
 Customer’s vision often isn’t cost / schedule constrained
 Customer may resist identifying “true” science or technology floor 
• Teams that recognize, or adapt to, these considerations  
pragmatically & quickly fare better than teams that don’t
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Selecting R&DC (Typical Case)
• Typical Approach
 A Design:  Most* parameters reflect realistic desired capability
 B Design:  Most* parameters reflect science or technology floor
 C Design:  Most* parameters are between A & B capabilities
* but not necessarily all
• R&DC for B design reevaluated after A design to assure solution 
space bounded 
 Presumes A design done first
• Many parameters varied concurrently due to need to cover 
broad solution space in limited time** 
 Experience shows teams can sufficiently understand parameter 
sensitivities
** after approach originally used by Mr. John Oberright, NASA / GSFC  
Emeritus, for Space Technology-5 concept design study (1999)
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Challenges in Determining Credible Design 
Convergence 
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• Concept design is inherently an exploratory process with 
relatively high uncertainty
• Concept design teams learn at high rate
 Early assumptions & conclusions may be invalidated by later findings or 
by unpredictable discovery of unknown unknowns
• Yet, indicators are desired to help avoid inferring convergence 
prematurely, e.g., due to:
 Insufficient rigor
 Study funds or time being exhausted
 Pressure to meet a milestone deliverable, etc. 
 Biases
Convergence Indicators Difficult to Define 
Objectively
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Convergence Determinations Often 
Evident Only in Hindsight  
Figure 5
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Why Early Cost Estimates Tend to be  
Optimistic 
• A common characteristic of concept design is costs for a given 
design tend to increase with each design cycle
 Particularly true for immature mission concepts that advance state of the 
art and that have high design uncertainty
• As teams progress through cycles, they learn more of what may 
have been omitted / incorrectly assumed in prior cycles 
 After B cycle, cost of A design may increase for given technical capability
 After C cycle, cost of A design may increase again, & cost of B design 
may increase
 Causes A & B points to move to right in Fig. 5
 When accompanied by schedule increases, A & B points also move into 
page
 After C cycle, learning tapers off for most designs 
 Sometimes a D cycle is needed, or may be planned from outset
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Why Early Cost Estimates Tend to be  
Optimistic (Cont’d)
• Cost analysis is normally performed using multiple methods
 One method is “grass roots” - uses a work breakdown structure (WBS)
• WBS dictionary for most space mission elements is relatively 
well known & largely existing, e.g., 
 Spacecraft, launch, ground systems, etc.
• Conversely, WBS dictionary for new instruments is unique 
 Design dependent, evolves as instrument design evolves 
 Key aspect for designs dominated by new instruments
• Multiple cost cycles typically needed to develop well understood 
WBS free of significant gaps & overlaps
 Gaps common in design & cost in early cycles as team learns
 Cost fidelity improves with understanding of both design and WBS
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Subjective Criterion for Convergence 
Determination – Significant Surprises
• One subjective criterion for credible convergence is whether 
team has experienced significant surprises
• Team that hasn’t experienced at least a few significant surprises 
should be cautious of its results
• Lack of surprises may indicate:
 Team hasn’t progressed sufficiently down learning curve 
 Team didn’t sufficiently exercise trade space or mitigate biases
 Concept design study objective wasn’t sufficiently challenging
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Recommended Practices
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General Guidance
• Treat design cycles as precious resource 
 Essential, but in limited supply due to time & resources available
 Focus team efforts on developing product, omit peripheral tasks 
• Don’t retrofit A & B designs with insights from later cycles
 Time better spent just applying learning to final design
• Don’t let first cost estimate be final cost estimate
 Be cautious of early results, they may not be as initially appear
• Document design results in reports at end of each cycle
• Maintain 1st order analysis depth in concept design
• Avoid significant rounding errors
• Recognize typical phases of concept design
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• Pre-Phase A & Phase A teams evaluate multiple designs in 
broad trade space in relatively short period
 Analysis tools used typically are 1st order precision, agile enough to 
adapt to frequent & significant system level changes
 Analogy:  “Hacksaw”
• By comparison, analysis tools typically used in:
 Phase B are 2nd order precision; assume system level design stable 
 Analogy:  “File”
 Phase C are 3rd order precision; assume both system & subsystem level 
designs stable 
 Analogy:  “Polisher”
Maintain 1st Order Level of Analysis Depth 
in Concept Design:  Analogy
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Maintain 1st Order Level of Analysis Depth 
in Concept Design:  Analogy (Cont’d)
• Team using “hacksaw” in Phase C has done something wrong
 Didn’t credibly converge 1st order solution by end of Phase A
 Re-doing system level concept design work late & out of sequence
• Team using “polisher” in Phase A is doing something wrong
 Won’t move quickly or broadly enough to rough-out & credibly converge 
1st order solution*
 Recognize some design elements may not even exist in final concept design
* Some high risk elements may selectively warrant added scrutiny
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Avoid Significant Rounding Errors
• Rounding errors can significantly affect margin determination if 
team doesn’t use sufficient numerical safeguards
 In some cases, rounding errors can fully mask margins such as those for 
mass & power shown in Fig. 3
• To avoid masking resource margins, bookkeep design & 
performance calculations to 3 significant digits & report out to 
2 significant digits*
 Should not be taken to imply there is 3-digit accuracy in concept design 
work -- there usually is not
 Simply a numerical safeguard to avoid propagating rounding errors that 
could overwhelm ability to adequately determine design or performance 
margins
* as a minimum guideline
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Recognize Four Unofficial, but Typical, 
Phases of Concept Design
• Concept design teams developing immature mission concepts 
that advance state of the art often experience four phases of 
work
 1) Unbridled Optimism 
 2) Shock
 3) Denial
 4) Acceptance
• The quicker a team moves through phases 1,2, & 3 and arrives 
at Phase 4, the better that team will fare
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Closing Thoughts
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Closing Thoughts 
• Concept design phases have extraordinary leverage over  
project success
 There is a business case to conduct in rigorous & pragmatic fashion
 Particularly for immature mission concepts that advance state of the art and 
that have high design uncertainty
 Provide unique venue to explore & converge system level design
• Done well, concept design can provide executable system level 
design baseline for project teams in Phase B & later phases
• Not done well, some work of concept design phases usually will 
have to be done again
 The later this realization occurs, the more expensive the resulting 
redesign is likely to be
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Questions ?
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Effect of Rounding Errors on Margin 
Determination:  Example
Case 1:  Power Available = 200 W
Max. Estimated Power Required = 249 W
Power Margin =   100 (200 W – 249 W) / 249 W   =  -19.7%
Case 2:   Power Available = 200 W
Max. Estimated Power Required = 151 W
Power Margin =   100 (200 W – 151 W) / 151 W  =  32.5%
The margins for Cases 1 and 2 are -19.7% and +32.5%, respectively 
Now consider a third case in which a designer rounds calculations to the     
1st digit in Cases 1 and 2
Case 3:   Power Available = 2 x 102 W
Max. Estimated Power Required = 2 x 102 W  
Power Margin =   100 (2 x 102 W – 2 x 102 W) / 2 x 102 W  =      0%
The margin for Case 3 is 0%
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Effect of Rounding Errors on Margin 
Determination:  Example (Cont’d)
• Required power margin at end of pre-Phase A is 30% (Fig. 3) 
 Comparing Case 3 to Case 2 shows how rounding to 1st digit can fully 
mask a margin of over 30%  
 Additional errors can accrue when combinations of rounded results are 
used in successive calculations
• To avoid masking resource margins, bookkeep design & 
performance calculations to 3 significant digits & report out to   
2 significant digits* 
• Note:  
 Margin calculation method is per ref. (f), Table 1.06
* as a minimum guideline
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Benefit of Study Phase Investment 
Ref. (a), Fig. 2-1 (Dec 1992)
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Data points shown are for 26 
space programs including: 
 • Hubble Space Telescope 
 • TDRSS 
 • Gamma Ray Obs 1978 
 • Gamma Ray Obs 1982 
 • SeaSat 
 • Pioneer Venus 
 • Voyager
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Documenting Concept Design Results 
in Reports at End of Each Design Cycle
• Provides official study record of what team did, how team 
did it, & what team found for present (& future) team use
• Reports are developed for each subsystem / discipline
 Built from standardized templates
 Include analysis methods & example calculations
 Provide coherent technical waypoints that enable team to recall 
designs & performance from prior cycles
Often needed for scaling or comparison 
 High rate of design changes makes recollection difficult otherwise
 Used for system level review, subsystem integration, independent 
review, new / follow-on team member orientation
• Once approved, reports typically are under informal 
configuration control of Mission Systems Engineer
 Briefings can be generated quickly from approved reports
 Briefings contain only information in approved reports
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Role of (Selected) Resource Margins on 
Required Convergence 
• Solid black curve in Fig. 3 must be within envelope of required 
margins
 Power & Dry Mass Margin requirements (per ref. (f)) are shown in Fig. 3
 End Phase A:  ≥ 25%
 End Phase B:  ≥ 20%
 End Phase C:  ≥ 15%
• Cost (not shown in Fig. 3) serves as design constraint  
 Cost margin (per ref. (g)) 
 Cost through Phase D:  ≥ 30% (guideline at Phase B start)
 Cost through Phase D:  ≥ 25% (requirement at Phase C start)
• Other programmatic margin requirements apply as well, e.g., 
 Schedule margin (per ref. (g)), not shown in Fig. 3
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Recognize Typical (but Unofficial) Phases 
of Concept Design
• Concept design teams developing new designs that advance  
state of the art often experience four phases of work 
1) Unbridled Optimism
 This phase features unbridled, optimistic performance desires levied as 
“requirements” before team gains credible understanding of associated 
cost & schedule
 Meetings often not well-focused on study objectives
 Instead, feature extended advocacy discussions (e.g., why mission has best 
science of all competing missions, why it has best chance to win, etc.)
2) Shock
 This brief phase usually begins after team completes its first credible cost 
estimate
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Recognize Typical (but Unofficial) Phases 
of Concept Design (Cont’d) 
3) Denial  
 This phase features abundant rationalizations as to why models used to 
estimate costs weren’t representative
 Team points to any aspect of mission - except excessively high technical 
capability - as reason costs are too high, so science return remains 
compelling relative to competition
4) Acceptance 
 This phase features ultimate realization technical capability / science 
return must be lowered to design a credible mission concept 
One that meets cost & schedule constraints according to established 
independent review standards
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NASA Project Life Cycle 
NASA Procedural Requirements 7120.5E
